Many persons during the course of
their lives ask “who an I?” This question is usually prompted by the behaviour
they realise exhibit and how others react to them. This soul searching,
however, is made difficult by the fact that there is no clear understanding of
the self. This is not a problem encountered only by the regular man, but
psychologists—scientists of behaviour—are also unclear of what the self is.
Some psychologists equate the self
with the ego, id, self-concept and even personality, but as Osborne (1996), states using these terms
interchangeably with self only
continues a confusion that already exists.
The
mystery surrounding the self is one consequence of the early twentieth century
desire to brand psychology a science. Before that period William James’ study
of the self described the entity as a product of the mind’s inner workings, in
other words not something that can necessarily be observed. Nonetheless, with
the turn of the century came new ideals about psychology. Behaviourists rallied
for the scientific status of Psychology. They believed Psychology must be given
the same prestige as was given to the medical sciences and called for a more
scientific methodology in the discipline. As a result, concepts such as the
unconscious, its effect on behaviour and mental processes were deemed
irrelevant even taboo. Nevertheless, with the proven impracticality of
restricting the study of self only to observable behaviour, the psychological
aspect of the entities study began to recover from its near disregard (Burns,
1979; Hamachek, 1978).
Despite the problems that accompany trying to truly understand what exactly the self is, some have posed definitions which they believe effectively define this unclear entity. Osborne describes it as “the integration of self-concept, self-esteem and self presentation strategies that influence the manner in which the individual thinks about, perceives and responds to his / her social world” (as cited in Osborne, 1996, p. 3). Hamachek (1978), on the other hand simply phrases it as “what we know about ourselves” (p. 6).
Secondly only to the question of
what exactly is the self, is the question of how is it formed. William James in 1890 began the in
depth investigation that today characterizes the self in psychology. James wrote
of a global self and the distinction
that lies in it. He labeled one part of the self
the subjective I, which actively
experiences and the other part the objective me, which social influence
(through experience) pushes on. Even though there is a conceptual
distinction, he noted the two aspects of the self were less practically
separated since they are at the same time part of the experiencing process.
James believed the whole self developed from a combination of the four
components of the me-self: the
spiritual, social, material and bodily selves. He viewed the spiritual self as
the supreme entity since it encompassed how we feel, our intellect and all
other internal processes. The social self is whom we choose to associate with;
usually persons who we care about and opinions we value. The material and
bodily selves are very much intertwined; both deal with how we portray
ourselves physically in order to garner favourable reaction from others.
Together they construct a total concept of who we are (Burns, 1979).
Charles Cooley recognized that the
social environment significantly influences how one sees him or herself. Cooley
states that our identities develop only when we can view ourselves as other
view us, including the judgements and perceptions they might have of us.
Furthermore, identities are continually strengthened when the cues produced
from interaction are used to construct our self-idea (Schellenberg, 1992). This
reciprocity is the basis of Cooley’s “looking-glass self” theory (as cited in
Hamachek, 1978, p. 55). A theory which shows how the self comes forth from
interpersonal communication.
George Mead used the work of James and Cooley before him to develop a
comprehensive theory on how the self is a creation of society via social
interaction. He states that individual organisms gain a sense of self through
social interaction. Hamachek (1978), defined this interaction as “the medium of
exchange through which we hone our perceptions of the outside world, develop
our interpersonal skills, extend intelligence, and acquire attitudes about
ourselves” (p. 18). As a cornerstone of the theory, Mead explained that
interaction takes place in terms of symbols and meanings. Symbols define the
manner in which a particular object is portrayed and in doing so determine the
meanings people will appoint. They symbols are everywhere and dictate not only
how people will interact with each other but also how they will interact with,
and react to the wider society (Haralambos & Holborn, 1995).
While he does recognize that the capacity to develop self is innate, he
states self is not a product of
biological or logical processes but one of social experience. In other words he
argued that the individual’s self is exclusively an outcome of social
interaction. The social activities the individual experiences, enables him to
create his own reality in which he is free to interpret meanings of objects,
activities and situations. The individual organism uses this fluid reality to
help in his self definition, stepping outside of himself he is able to react to
himself as an object. This “experiential transaction,” whereby he adopts the
perceived attitudes of others towards himself and views himself from their
perspective, resulting in a reflexive objectification, creates a prime
situation for the subjective process of human interaction within the structure
of society, out of which the self
emerges.
The self from society is further understood when the concepts of language, play and games are taken
into account. Mead stated it is through language, the most significant symbol,
that the individual is able to take on the attitudes of others toward himself.
It enables him to respond to himself as others would, an exercise which can be
clearly seen in the play and game stages of self development. In play
the individual becomes aware of himself via one significant other at a
time. In this role-playing exercise he imitates the gestures, tones, behaviour
and other aspects of the significant other in order to react to himself as that
person would. At the game stage,
during role-taking, the child balances many persons in the game as well as the
rules governing their roles. Here he creates a “generalized other,”—a miniature
representation of society. When the child reacts to himself from the point of
view of the generalized other he has achieved true selfhood, for now he
understands how society sees him and by extension how he sees himself. (Cronk,
2000)
From Mead’s theory so far it would seem that people are blanks that only
absorb and reflect society. However, Mead was careful to show the two divisions
of the self: the me, and the I. This division was inspired by James’
work, but Mead’s take on the two parts seems to be more definitive. The me
is the passive self that society impinges on and so it becomes the assumed
attitudes of others characterized by societal conventions. The I¸ on the other hand, is the active self
which, enters into social relations with other selves and responds to the
conventions of the me. While the I sometimes direct the individual to
conform, it’s initiative can also direct them not to. Because there can be no I without a me and vice verse they work together to form a fully functioning
self (O’Donnell, 1992).
As convincing as Mead’s theory seems it does have opposition. Sigmund Freud believed the ego (which he used to mean self) only emerges to balance the struggle between the instinctual id and the repressive superego. In essence, Freud’s self has nothing to do with social interaction and is purely a biological creation. Carl Jung, a Freudian, did not believe as Freud did that the self was the ego but that the ego was only the conscious portion of self. Jung contended that after years of inequality between the conscious ego and the unconscious levels of cognition, the self emerges only when a balance is forged between these two states of consciousness (Burns, 1979). Sullivan while conceding that the self is influenced by interpersonal experience, his interpersonal relationships is limited only to the mother figure and very much devoid of any wider social experience (Burns, 1979; Guntrip, 1961).
Nevertheless, Neo-Freudians have come to accept that that the self cannot emerge solely from instinctive biological processes or isolated interaction, but that the wider society does indeed play a far greater role in who we become. Case in point; Alfred Adler states that as children we are made to feel inferior when the older persons we interact with persistently tell us what to do. Later, this inferiority takes on a social aspect as when the individual compares himself to others he feels second-rate. This second classing prompts him to strive superiority. Adler argued that this quest for social superiority is the
element that creates our sense of self (Santrock, 2000; Burns, 1979),
A true grasp of how important
Mead’s theory is can only be achieved when one examines instances in which
children have been deprived of social experience. Such is the Case of Anna, a
little girl who was locked away for years by her grand father. Her solitary
incarceration rendered the muscles in her legs inactive and her reactive
capacities to light and sound were deadened She could expressed no emotion
except a temper when restrained and had no control over her bodily functions.
However when she was rescued and placed in constant interaction, despite some
setbacks, she made striking improvements. She was able to exhibit limit
self-care and speak what limited communicative skills she could develop. Even though she improved, she had gone too
long without social interaction and died soon after her discovery (Hamachek,
1978).
If self is product of instinctual
and biological process as Freud theorized, then Anna’s personality would have
developed regardless of how much social activity and experience she had been
deprived of. Her ordeal and others like it seem to prove true Mead’s theory and
in doing so helps to its credibility.
References
Burns, R. B. (1979). The self concept in theory,
measurement, development and
dehaviour . New York:
Longman.
Cronk, G (2000).
George Herbert Mead. The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
http://www.utm.edu/researh/iep/m/mead.htm (24 Oct. 2001)
Guntrip, H .S. (1961). Personality structure and human
interaction. New York:
International University Press.
Hamacheck, D. E. (1978). Encounters with the self.
United States of
America: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston.
Haralambos, M., Holborn, M. (1995). Sociology: Themes and
perspective.
London: Collins Educational.
O’Donnell, M. (1992). A new introduction to sociology.
London: Thomas Nelson
Osborne, R. E. (1996). Self: An eclectic approach.
Needham Heights,
Massachusetts: Allyn and Bacon.
Santrock, J. W. (2000). Psychology. United States of
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Schellenberg, J. A. (1992). An invitation to social psychology.
Boston:
Allyn and Bacon.